Jurisdiction and the Hunt: Subsistence

Regulation, ANILCA and Totemoff
This Note discusses the Alaska NationalInterestLands Conservation Act ("ANILCA") and the relationshipbetween state and federaljurisdictionover subsistence hunting on Alaskan lands. It focuses on the case of Totemoff v. State, a hunting case in which
native subsistence hunters shot deer on federal land and were arrested and convicted of an Alaska criminalregulation banning the
use of spotlighting as a hunting method. The Note analyzes
whether the hunters were properly convicted and argues that there
was no jurisdictionto prosecute under state law, as ANILCA provided a sufficiently comprehensive regulatoryscheme so as to preempt state regulationof the same activities on the same land. The
Note then discusses how it may have been possiblefor these federal regulations to be litigated in state court, although it questions
whether state prosecutorshad the authorityto bring the case.
I.

INTRODUCTION

"We're stuck now with a system that's in total conflict."'
The fight for land use is one of the defining features of Alaskan culture and jurisprudence. Commercial and subsistence users

are often pitted against each other in a struggle to gain priority
over resources to which access is limited. This struggle recently
came to a head in the case of Totemoff v. State,2 in which the
Alaska Supreme Court placed itself firmly at odds with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Since the Supreme
Court has denied certiorari on both federal and state cases,' no

resolution is in sight.
In an attempt to provide such a resolution, this Note analyzes
the conflict of law created by the divergent holdings of the state
and federal courts. After discussions of the history of the fight for
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1. Supreme Court Lets Stand Ruling on Subsistence, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, June 11, 1996, at B3.
2. 905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2499 (1996).
3. See Totemoff v. Alaska, 116 S. Ct. 2499 (1996) (state); Alaska v. Babbitt,
116 S. Ct. 1672 (1996) (federal).
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jurisdiction in Part II and of the facts of the case in Part III.A, Part
III.B will explain the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Totemoff
and demonstrate how the supreme court sought to time Totemoff
to influence the Ninth Circuit's view of the jurisdictional question.
Part IV will then analyze the question of whether the state courts
could properly assert jurisdiction over the defendants in Totemoff
and to what extent.4 The Note concludes that while the state court
might in fact be empowered to hear this case, it is not empowered
to apply state law. Since the federal and state regulations are identical in form, the state ultimately achieved the right result, but by
the wrong means.
II. REGULATION OF SUBSISTENCE HUNTING
Before we can approach the courts' reasoning in this case,
some background on hunting is necessary, as its importance in
Alaska - and therefore to the Alaskan courts - cannot be underes-

timated. For many residents of Alaska, hunting is a way of life that
is part of their cultural heritage, as subsistence hunting both feeds
the hunters and maintains their spiritual connection to the land.5
For others, who do not have the same long history of subsistence
hunting as a way of life, the hunt is nonetheless equally important
as a way of asserting their independence from the constraints of
modem society.6 The importance of hunting to all Alaskans is
codified in the equal access clauses of Article VIII of the Alaska
Constitution, which guarantee that all Alaskan citizens will have
equal access to the state's natural resources.7 It is not surprising,
therefore, that a movement to conserve federally owned resources8
4. Judicial and legislative jurisdiction are also referred to as procedural and

substantive jurisdiction.
5. See William M. Bryner, Note, Toward a Group Rights Theory for Reme-

dying Harm to the Subsistence Culture ofAlaska Natives, 12 ALASKA L. REv. 293,
295-96 (1995); Mary Beth McLeod, Note, The Subsistence Debate in Alaska: Who

Will Control Navigable Waters?, 3 W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 355, 355-56

(1996).
6. See Darren K. Cottriel, Comment, The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First
Century: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save an American Tradition?,27 PAC. L.J.

1235, 1286-87 (1996).
7. See ALASKA CONsT. art. VIII, §§ 3, 5, 17; see generally Stephen M. White,
"EqualAccess" to Alaska's Fish and Wildlife, 11 ALAsKA L. REv. 277 (1994).

8. In its report accompanying H.R. 39, the bill that became the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA"), the U.S. Senate Energy
and Natural Resources Committee cited the importance of conservation as justification for ANILCA and the previously enacted Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act, Pub. L. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§
1601-1629a (1994)). See S. REP. No. 96-413, at 129-130 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070, 5074. The report particularly noted the long history of
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prompted a struggle among Alaskans between native subsistence
hunters seeking preferential treatment and sport and commercial
users seeking equal access.9
This battle for priority resulted in an apparent victory for subsistence hunters. In the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Acto ("ANILCA"), Congress guaranteed a subsistence preference, stating that "the taking on public lands of fish and wildlife
for nonwasteful subsistence uses shall be accorded priority over
the taking on such lands of fish and wildlife for other purposes.""
Through ANILCA, Congress gave the State of Alaska an opportunity to regulate hunting on federal lands so long as it maintained a subsistence preference, 2 and the state enacted a subsistence regulatory scheme in compliance with ANILCA's
requirements." However, that regulatory scheme was short-lived,
as the Alaska Supreme Court held that the state was barred by the
equal access clauses from implementing regulations granting such
hunting preferences.14 Although the supreme court allowed for the
possibility of new regulations sufficient to satisfy both ANILCA
and the equal access clauses, the state legislature was unable to
implement such regulations successfully.' 5 As a result of the state's
failure to implement ANILCA, the federal government took over
regulation of hunting on federal lands,"6 and the Department of Interior promulgated new hunting regulations. 7 Many of these
"conservation of wildlife by [f]ederal withdrawal of their habitats under protective management," and noted the importance of preemptive protection of wildlife
even in areas where wildlife populations had not yet been greatly reduced in
numbers. Id. at 173-74, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5117-18.
9. See McLeod, supra note 5, at 356-58.
10. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3101-3233 (1994)).

11. 16 U.S.C. §3114; see also McLeod, supra note 5, at 358; Joan M.Nockels,
Note, Katie John v. United States: Redefining FederalPublic Lands in Alaska, 26

ENVrL. L. 693, 694-95 (1996); Natasha Summit, Note, State v. Kenaitze Indian
Tribe:A "Journey"for Subsistence Rights, 13 COOLEY L. REy. 615, 627-28 (1996).

12. See 16 U.S.C. § 3115(d).
13. See ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (Michie 1996); Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d
698, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1672 (1996); McDowell v.
State, 785 P.2d 1, 2 (Alaska 1989).

14. See McDowell, 785 P.2d at 9 (holding that the state regulations implementing ANILCA were in violation of the equal access clauses, but providing
that, for the purposes of implementing ANILCA, a classification scheme based on
individual characterization of prospective subsistence hunters might be permissible).
15. See Babbitt, 72 F.3d at 701; Ralph Thomas, Knowles Wants a Public Vote
on Subsistence, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 23, 1996, at Al.
16. See Thomas, supra note 15, at Al.
17. See id. The federal regulations of subsistence hunting are codified at 36
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regulations, however, particularly as they relate to the manner of
hunting, appear to have been copied from the general Alaska
18
hunting regulations, which apply everywhere else in the state.
The uniformity of the state and federal regulations resulted in
confusion as to whether the state regulations could apply to incidents occurring on federal lands, and the resolution of this conflict
was at issue in Totemoff v. State. 9 Whether the state regulations
would apply is particularly interesting because the federal regulations are identical to the general Alaska hunting regulations which
they purport to supersede.20 The state contended in Totemoff, and
the Alaska Supreme Court agreed, that not only were the state
regulations applicable to hunting activity on federal lands, but indeed, that one of the reasons for such applicability was the symmetry between the state and federal regulations.2 '
III. A STRANGE CHRONOLOGY
A. The Hunt
The Totemoff war over jurisdiction began in the middle of a
cold December night, when state troopers patrolling Prince William Sound saw a small two-man boat shining a spotlight onto several island beaches.' Deeming this to be suspicious activity, they
followed the boat to Naked Island, a federally owned island in the
sound, where they saw one person "disappearing into the trees for
a few seconds and then returning to the boat at a slower pace. '
They then surprised the two men, Mike Totemoff and Henry Milette, whom they discovered with a total of five freshly gutted deer
C.F.R. §§ 242.1-.27 (1996).
18. Compare 36 C.F.R. § 242.25(b)(1)(viii) (1996) with ALASKA ADMIN. CODE
tit. 5, § 92.080(7) (1996). Note that the state regulations upon which the Department of the Interior based the federal regulations were not the regulations the
state attempted to promulgate under ANILCA in order to govern federal lands,
but are the general regulations that predate ANILCA.
19. 905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2499 (1996). While the

significance of this problem is not immediately apparent, as the effect of the federal and state regulations is identical, the future effects are far-reaching, as a de-

termination of whose regulations control also determines who has the power to
change regulation of subsequent use.

20. See id. at 960; see also 36 C.F.R. § 242.25(b)(1)(viii); ALASKA ADMIN.
tit. 5, § 92.080(7). Again, the state regulations in question are the general
regulations and not those the state attempted to implement under ANILCA to
CODE

govern federal lands.

21. See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 960.
22. See Totemoff v. State, 866 P.2d 125, 126 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993), rev'd,
905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2499 (1996).
23. Id.
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carcasses, two rifles, a spotlight and other hunting equipment.2'
The officers concluded that Totemoff and Milette had been
taking deer unlawfully by spotlighting,' and charged them accordingly.26 They then returned the hunters to the larger vessel
from which they were working: a fifty-foot fishing boat anchored
about a mile away.'
Totemoff and Milette promptly moved to dismiss,
"contending, among other things, that the state had no jurisdiction
to prosecute them." '
The district judge denied this motion.
Finding that the hunting occurred on federal lands, the state district court held that the state's concurrent jurisdiction was not preempted by ANILCA2 or its implementing regulations."
In reaching this conclusion, the court first noted that the federal regulations promulgated pursuant to ANILCA provide that
"State of Alaska fish and wildlife regulations, other than subsistence regulations, apply to public lands unless the [subsistence]
board finds it necessary to promulgate regulations which supersede
state regulations in order to insure the opportunity for subsistence
take of fish or wildlife."'" The court then found that these federal
regulations specifically adopted certain state restrictions on subsistence hunting techniques, including a ban on spotlighting.3 2 Because there were licensing procedures for prospective subsistence
hunters and regulations governing their hunting activities, the
judge felt it inappropriate to allow hunters to "use any method
they think they can arguably support knowing it's in violation of
existing regulations and argue subsistence later.""
24. See id.
25. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.080(7) (1996). Spotlighting is the
practice of hunting by artificial light at night. See Ruth S. Musgrave et al., The
Status of Poachingin the United States - Are We ProtectingOur Wildlife, 33 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 977, 988 (1993).
26. See Totemoff, 866 P.2d at 126.
27. See State v. Totemoff, No. 3WH-91-25 (Alaska Super. Ct., 3d Judicial
Dist., Sept. 25, 1991) (ruling from bench denying motion to dismiss), transcribed
in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 71, 71-72, Totemoff v. Alaska,
116 S. Ct. 2499 (1996) (No. 95-1512) [hereinafter District Court Order].
28. Totemoff, 866 P.2d at 126.
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101 et seq. (1994).
30. See District Court Order, supra note 27, at 83.
31. Id. at 78 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 242.14 (1995)).
32. See District Court Order, supra note 27, at 79-80; see also ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. 5, § 92.080(7) (1996); 36 C.F.R. § 242.25(b)(1)(viii) (1996).
33. District Court Order, supra note 27, at 83. This argument - that
"subsistence use" is an affirmative defense that may be raised under ANILCA was raised by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Alexander, 938 F.2d 942, 948
(9th Cir. 1991). The court, rather than "strik[ing] down a state regulation that is
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At trial, Totemoff and Milette were convicted in the state district court of a violation of the Alaska regulation,' and thereafter
appealed, claiming their motion to dismiss had been denied improperly. 5 The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
findings, arguing that the state regulations could be enforced because "there is no actual inconsistency between the state and federal regulations in question here."36
B. The Alaska Supreme Court vs. the Ninth Circuit
The following February, Totemoff appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, and the state filed its Response and Opposition the
following month. Both documents assumed, just as both lower
courts had found as fact, that the entire occurrence was on federal
lands.37
DisConflict with the federal courts began when the Federal
States38
trict Court for the District of Alaska decided John v. United
("Katie John"), holding that under the federal navigational servitude,39 ANILCA applies to navigable waters within Alaska.40 Beinconsistent with federal law... [chose to] permit [defendants] to defend against
a criminal prosecution on the ground that their activity is protected by
ANILCA." Id. For a discussion of the application of the "Alexander defense" to
this case, see infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
34. The Alaska hunting regulations are criminal. The Fish and Game Code
provides that, with certain exceptions, violations of any provisions of the Code or
regulations promulgated thereunder (such as these) constitute misdemeanors.
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.925 (Michie 1996); see also id. § 16.05.920 (prohibiting the
hunting of game except as permitted by regulation); id. § 16.05.255 (authorizing
the Board of Game to "adopt regulations it considers advisable.. . for... establishing the means and methods employed in the pursuit, capture, taking, and
transport of game"); id. § 16.05.258 (authorizing regulation of subsistence take of
fish and game).
35. See Totemoff v. State, 866 P.2d 125, 126 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993), rev'd,
905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2499 (1996).
36. Id. at 128.
37. See William E. Caldwell, Chronology of the Alaska Supreme Court's Disposition in Totemoff v. State, Appendix to Cross Petition for Certiorari by Native
American Resource Fund at la, Alaska v. Babbitt, 116 S.Ct. 1672 (1996) (No. 951084). Milette's lawyer failed to file a timely appeal; he was later disbarred, in
part as a result of this failure. Telephone interview with Paul E. Malin, Public
Defender, Anchorage, Alaska (Jan. 9, 1996).
38. No. A90-0484-CV, consolidated with No. A92-0264-CV, 1994 WL 487830
at *1 (D. Alaska Mar. 30, 1994), rev'd sub nom. Alaska v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 549
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1672 (1996).
39. The navigational servitude is a right retained by the federal government
grounded in the Commerce Clause. The court described its purpose as "to relieve
the government of the obligation to compensate an owner of riparian, littoral, or
submerged lands for acts which normally require compensation under the Fifth
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fore this point, the proceedings in Totemoff had seemed fairly
straightforward. With the federal courts' appearance on the scene,
the picture muddied considerably, as the two court systems maneuvered for jurisdiction over the subject.
The Katie John court first noted that ANILCA applies to all
"public lands," which are defined as lands, waters and interests
therein to which the federal government holds title." However,
the statutory language does not define what constitutes "title," and
so the federal district court embarked on a quest for legislative intent.4 2 Although the court determined that the navigational servitude probably was not sufficient to constitute title per se, the court
held that regulatory authority under the servitude was sufficient to
empower the federal government to regulate navigable waterways
under ANILCA.4 ' Furthermore, it recognized such a regulatory
scope was necessary to effect ANILCA's purpose."
In the wake of the Katie John decision, the Alaska Supreme
Court granted Totemoff's petition for review. 45 However, the supreme court appeared more interested in reconsidering the federal
district court's logic in Katie John than in deciding the issues raised
on appeal. In its order granting Totemoff's petition, the court
specified three issues to be addressed:
A. Whether the prosecution is "subject to a defense that spotlighting is a 'customary and traditional' method of taking game
which is protected by ANILCA?"
B. "If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, is
there a sufficient non-federal nexus in this case to sustain the
conviction solely under Alaska law?"
C. "With respect to question B above, is the [s]tate precluded by
the [Katie John] decision from contending that tidelands or lands
under navigable
' ' water within the three-mile limit are not subject
to ANILCA?

4

While the Alaska Supreme Court was obviously concerned
Amendment." Katie John, 1994 WL 487830, at *14 (citing Boone v. United
States, 944 F.2d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1983)).
40. See Katie John, 1994 WL 487830, at *18. While applying the navigational
servitude, the court determined that the related reserved water rights doctrine
should not be applied in this context in Alaska, although it saw the possibility that
it might apply in similar circumstances in other states. See id. at *14.
41. Id. at *12 (citing Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub.
L. No 96-487, § 102, 94 Stat. 2371, 2375 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3102 (1994))).
42- See id. at *12-*18.
43. See id. at *18.

44. See id.
45. See Totemoff v. State, No. S-6151 (Alaska April 18, 1994) (order granting
petition for review).
46. Caldwell, supra note 37, at 2a (quoting Totemoff v. State, No. S-6151
(Alaska Apr. 18, 1994) (order granting petition for review)).
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about the issues raised in KatieJohn, so was the Ninth Circuit, and,
on May 17, 1994, the Ninth Circuit granted the petitions of the
state and federal governments for an interlocutory appeal.' Seeing
this, Totemoff and the state filed a "Stipulated Request for Stay"
with the supreme court pending the Ninth Circuit outcome; the
court granted this stay.4 However, after oral arguments in the
Ninth Circuit case, the supreme court "sua sponte issued an order
vacating the ... stay and directing that briefing proceed forthwith

on an expedited basis." 9
The briefs were filed just before the Ninth Circuit issued its
first decision in Alaska v. Babbitt," the case with which Katie John
was joined and whose name it took on appeal. In Babbitt, the
Ninth Circuit held that, while the district court incorrectly applied
the overly broad navigational servitude in determining the extent
of federal lands for the purposes of ANILCA, the doctrine of
"reserved water rights" did apply to those waters appurtenant to
the lands protected under ANILCA.' That decision was then filed
with the Alaska Supreme Court, which requested supplemental
briefs concerning its implications." Shortly thereafter, the supreme court heard oral arguments in Totemoff and within sixty
days filed its opinion.53
In addressing possible federal preemption, the supreme court
held that ANILCA permitted state subsistence management.m
Under its analysis, in order for a state law to apply in an area that
may be federally regulated, three tests are applied: (1) whether
federal statutes expressly preempt state regulation; (2) if no federal statute expressly preempts state regulation, whether Congress
manifested an intent to occupy exclusively the field being regulated; and (3) whether, if neither of the above conditions is met,
any federal statute (or any regulation properly promulgated thereunder) is in actual conflict with the state regulation.55
The court held that state regulation in this case survived all
three tests. First, ANILCA did not expressly preempt state regula-

47. See id. at 3a.

48. See id.
49. Id. at 4a. The court never explained or justified this order.

50. 54 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 1995).
51. See id. at 554.
52. See Caldwell, supra note 37, at 5a.

53. See id. at 5a-6a.
54. See Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 961 (Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2499 (1996).
55. See id. at 958; see also California Fed. Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1987); Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc., 848 P.2d 1367,
1369 (Alaska 1993).
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tion.56 Second, Congress had manifested no intent to occupy the
field.' Relying on English v. General Electric Co.' 8 the court
noted that congressional intent to occupy a field can be inferred
either when the regulation is so pervasive that Congress seems to
have left no room for state regulation or when the regulations
touch on a field in which there is a clearly dominant federal interest.5 However, in cases where the field to be preempted has traditionally been occupied by the states, con gessional intent to occupy
the field must be "'clear and manifest."' The court held that since
hunting regulation has traditionally been in the state domain, such
a showing of "clear and manifest" intent had to be made." The
court did not find sufficient evidence of such an intent, noting that
it is possible for the state to "promulgat[e] hunting and fishing
regulations which may affect subsistence hunters on federal land,
so long as those regulations do not conflict with federal laws or
regulations [and that] [n]othing in Title VIII [of ANILCA] discloses a clear and manifest purpose to prohibit all state regulation
of subsistence hunting." 62
Finally, the court held that the state regulations were not in
actual conflict with ANILCA, which "does not protect the use of a
spotlight as a customary and traditional method of subsistence
hunting.56 3 Totemoff had argued that the state regulations are in
actual conflict with ANILCA as interpreted in United States v. AlexanderO because the regulations fail to provide any subsistence
defense.6" However, the court rejected this argument, holding that
ANILCA does not provide for such a defense.66 Indeed, it held
that ANILCA's protection was limited to specific modes of transportation.67 That, coupled with ANILCA's failure to mention
hunting methods, precluded the subsistence defense and created
no conflict between ANILCA and the state regulations.68
The court then held that ANILCA was irrelevant in any event,
56. See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 958.
57. See id. at 959.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

496 U.S. 72 (1990).
See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 958 (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 79).
See id. (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 79).
See id.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 961.
938 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1991).
See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 960. For a further discussion of the Alexander

interpretation of ANILCA and the "subsistence defense," see infra notes 156-59

and accompanying text.
66. See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 960.
67. See id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3121(b) (1994)).
68. See id. at 961.
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as a portion of the transaction had occurred on state lands.69 The
shots were fired and the spotlight was shone from navigable waters, and neither the navigational servitude nor the reserved water
rights doctrine granted the federal government jurisdiction over
the waters of Prince William Sound, which otherwise belong to the
state pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act. 0 As a related issue,
the court held that neither the navigational servitude nor the reserved water rights doctrine applied to this case.71 It noted that it
was not "bound by decisions of federal courts other than the
United States Supreme Court on questions of federal law, 72 and
that it was therefore not estopped from reconsidering the issue of
the applicability of ANILCA to navigable waters, despite the Katie
John decision.7 Its interpretation was that since neither the navigational servitude nor reserved water rights are possessory interests constituting title, navigational waters do not constitute federal
lands.74 The court held that it was therefore irrelevant whether
ANILCA allowed
spotlighting, as the spotlighting was done from
75
state lands.

Despite all of this, the Alaska Supreme Court ultimately reversed the lower court's decision. 7 That reversal, however, was on
limited grounds: Totemoff was entitled to challenge the validity of
the regulation under which he was prosecuted by showing that it
had been enacted without meeting all the procedural requirements
of the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act.7 This relative technicality aside, the court essentially affirmed the lower courts' decisions by holding as valid the application of the state hunting regulations.

8

After "winning" the Totemoff decision, the state petitioned
the Ninth Circuit for rehearing en banc of Alaska v. Babbitt, submitting the Totemoff decision as supplemental authority. The
State's request was denied, 9 although the Ninth Circuit thereafter
69. See id. at 964.
70. See id. at 962-63; Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)
(1994). The Submerged Lands Act conferred title to all lands submerged beneath
navigable waters to the states. See 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).
71. See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 963.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 965.
75. See id. at 968.
76. See id. at 973.
77. See id.; ALAsKA STAT. § 16.05.259 (1996).
78. See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 973.
79. See Caldwell, supra note 37, at 6a. The Alaska Attorney General thereafter commented that "the court wanted to get the opinion out as quickly as possible so the Ninth Circuit would have a chance to see it before it ruled on the re-
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did request letter briefs addressing Totemoffs public lands analysis.0 At this point, the Alaska Supreme Court withdrew its prior
opinion and issued a new opinion in which it added additional
strong rhetoric about how neither reserved water rights nor the
navigational servitude applied in the Totemoff case.8' The Ninth
Circuit in turn withdrew and reissued its opinion in Alaska v. Babbitt, with the only substantive change being the addition of a dissent by Judge Hall that was very similar in its reasoning to that of
Totemoff."
Conflict between the Alaska Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit is nothing new, and it has been particularly pronounced in
the area of native rights.n However, the language of the news reports of this case is particularly striking: "In no uncertain terms,
the... ruling defies [the Ninth Circuit]."' If the news report was
correct in reading the decision as a "defiant" one - an interpretation supported by the timing of the decision - the decision demands close scrutiny. Perhaps the Alaska Supreme Court, unsatisfied with the result in the Katie John case, sought to create conflict,
in the hope that the United States Supreme Court would grant certiorari."
This situation requires an examination of whether the supreme court's reasoning was based solidly on the evidence before
it or whether the decision was made with an eye toward the potentially far-reaching effects of the decision. The following sections
therefore will closely scrutinize the bases for the Alaska Supreme
Court's decision and attempt to decipher what ANILCA really
means.
consideration issue. Unfortunately, we didn't beat the clock." David Hulen,
Court Ties a New Knot in Subsistence Tangle: State Justices Defy Federal Waterway Rulings, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEws, Aug. 9, 1995, at Al.
80. See Caldwell, supra note 37, at 7a.

81. See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 964-66.
82. See Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698, 704-08 (9th Cir. 1995) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
83. For discussions of the conflict between the courts over native rights before
Totemoff, see Cheryl A. Rawls, Alaska Natives, 22 ENVTL. L. 1251 (1992); Kenton

Keller Pettit, Note, The Waiver of Tribal Sovereign Immunity in the Contractual
Context: Conflict Between the Ninth Circuit and the Alaska Supreme Court?, 10

ALASKA L. REV. 363 (1993). Direct conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the
Alaska Supreme Court is not limited to native rights, however. See, e.g., Irene W.
Bruynes, Note, Strict Liability and the Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent
Remedial Measures Under Evidence Rule 407, 5 ALASKA L. REv. 333 (1988)
(discussing conflicts over standards of proof in strict liability actions).
84. Hulen, supra note 79, at Al.
85. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari clearly was the State's wish; the

Alaska Attorney General described the case as one that "cries out for final resolution before the U.S. Supreme Court." Id.
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IV. JURISDIcrION AND THE STATE'S POWER TO PROSECUTE

The conflict in Totemoff is one of jurisdiction. As a consequence, this case is fundamentally about power: who has the power
to prosecute hunting violations, and who has the power to make
the regulations under which violators are prosecuted. These two
questions are addressed by the doctrines of judicial jurisdiction and
legislative jurisdiction, respectively. Although these doctrines
share some common elements, they are relatively independent.
A. Judicial Jurisdiction
Judicial jurisdiction refers to a court's power to hear a matter.86 Two basic questions must be answered in determining
whether a court has judicial jurisdiction: (1) whether the court has
the power to bring a party into court, and (2) whether the court has
the power to apply the relevant laws to that person.' The first tier
of analysis, referred to as in personam jurisdiction, is generally
rooted in physical power. According to the Supreme Court, "the
jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded
on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court [is] prerequisite to [the court's] rendition of a judgment personally binding
him."" Among the "reasonable" bases of jurisdiction noted in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws are acts committed in the
state.89
The requirement that the act occur within the state is the core
of in personam jurisdiction in the criminal context. The Model
Penal Code, for instance, states that "a person may be convicted
under the law of this [s]tate of an offense committed by his own

86. See United States v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 647-48 (1874).
87. For the purposes of this analysis, I am largely excluding in rem and quasi
in rem jurisdiction. Their treatment would be similar, however, as both play to
essentially the same issues of power as in personam jurisdiction.
88. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)). In the civil setting, the relevant test is
more permissive: whether the party has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."' Id.; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
188 (1977) (applying the International Shoe standard to in rem jurisdiction). The
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws expresses the limits of civil judicial jurisdiction slightly differently: "A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction
over a person if the person's relationship to the state is such as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 24(1) (1988). For a full enumeration of "reasonable bases," see id. §
27(1).
89.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 36 (1988).

1997]

JURISDICTIONAND THE HUNT

conduct or the conduct of another for which he is legally accountable if... the conduct that is an element of the offense or the result which is such an element occurs within [the] [s]tate."' While
the Alaska criminal code (Title 11 of the Alaska Statutes) lacks
such a jurisdictional statement, it may nonetheless be inferred, as
the court's jurisdiction is still limited by constitutional due process
concerns to persons acting either within the state or in a manner
designed to cause effects within the state.9'
Thus, since Totemoff and Milette acted within the state (by
hunting within its territorial boundaries), ' they could not contest
state jurisdiction over their persons and thus could reasonably expect to be haled into state court - assuming that state law applies
to their case.
If federal law applies, however, the analysis is somewhat more
complex. In many areas, the federal and state powers are concurrent, creating a web of laws and raising questions as to who may
enforce them. The general rule is that federal courts can enforce
all state laws, and state courts can enforce all federal laws that do
not provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction. As expressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Claflin v. Houseman, 3 "if exclusive jurisdiction be neither express nor implied, the [s]tate courts have concurrent jurisdiction whenever, by their own constitution, they are
competent to take it."94 In the Claflin decision, the Court reasoned
that
[t]he fact that a [s]tate court derives its existence and functions
from the [s]tate laws is no reason why it should not afford relief;
because it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is
just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the
[s]tate as it is to recognize the [s]tate laws.95
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1) (1985).
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 186

(1977). This Note is not addressing accomplice or conspiracy liability, as neither
is relevant to the facts at hand.

92. Although the lands are federally owned and subject to regulation under
the Property Clause, they are nonetheless lands within the State of Alaska.

ANILCA defines federal lands as "lands the title to which is in the United
States." 16 U.S.C. § 3102(2) (1994). Title certainly grants the federal government

regulatory prerogative with respect to federal lands by virtue of the Property
Clause. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976). However, the
state exercises concurrent jurisdiction over such lands, and to that extent, state
courts clearly have the authority to hear matters arising on federal lands within a
state. See id. at 543; California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S.
572, 580 (1987).
93. 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
94. Id. at 136.
95. Id. at 137; see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947) (citing Claflin,
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Thus, insofar as a federal statute does not specify an exclusive federal remedy, 6 federal matters can be heard in state courts.
ANILCA does not grant exclusive jurisdiction over violations
of its regulations to federal courts." It requires only that a subsistence priority "be implemented through appropriate limitations
[on hunting and fishing]"98 and stipulates that "[tihe Secretary shall
prescribe such regulations as are necessary and appropriate to
carry out his [subsistence management] responsibilities ... .,99 It
makes no mention of any other federal enforcement mechanism.'"
Neither does the statute impliedly reserve power to the federal courts. Indeed, the state was empowered to create its own
regulations implementing the subsistence preference."' The federal regulations were only adopted after the initial state regulatory
scheme failed due to the Alaska Supreme Court's holding that the
state regulations were unconstitutional and the state legislature did
not enact new regulations.102
93 U.S. at 137, as authority for the proposition that state courts have a duty to enforce federal laws).
96. For example, Congress has provided that "[t]he district courts of the
United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States,
of all offenses against the laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1994).
This provision probably does not apply to ANILCA, since ANILCA is not a
criminal statute contained within Title 18 of the United States Code. This is true
even though the provisions of ANILCA might have a "penal" quality, as the Supreme Court has held that states can enforce - and be required to enforce - federal laws that are penal in effect. See Testa, 330 U.S. at 392-93 (holding that while
a state may choose not to consider the penal laws of another state as contrary to
state policy, it could not so act with respect to a federal penal law, whose policy
was binding on all states). Moreover, compelling arguments recently have been
made for expansion of state-court jurisdiction to federal criminal matters. See,
e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the
Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction,46 HASTINGs L.J. 979, 1010-15
(1995) (noting that there is no constitutional bar to state courts hearing federal
criminal cases). But see Adam H. Kurland, First Principlesof American Federalism and the Nature of Federal CriminalJurisdiction,45 EMORY L.J. 1, 69 (1996)
(arguing against symmetrical constitutional treatment of state and federal crimes).
97. It does, however, limit the judicial remedy for a governmental failure to
"provide for the priority of subsistence uses" to suits in federal district court. 16
U.S.C. § 3117(c) (1994).
98. Id. § 3114.
99. Id. § 3124.
100. See id. §§ 3115,3124.
101. See id. § 3115(d).
102. See Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698,701 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the state
legislature's failure to adopt new subsistence regulations and the subsequent federal implementation of ANILCA); McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska
1989) (holding that the subsistence preference as enacted violates the equal access
clauses of the Alaska Constitution). See also Ralph Thomas, Knowles Wants a
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Thus, the state court might have been empowered under Claflin to hear the case under federal law. However, there remains the
question of whether the state is empowered to prosecute any violations. The historical rejection by state courts of federal prosecutions therein"s was quieted in part by Testa v. Katt, " which held
that state courts had a duty to enforce federal laws.10 5 However,
even in cases like Testa which allowed for federal prosecutions in
state courts, the prosecutions were brought by private parties
(where authorized) or federal officials.' The primary concern
with state prosecutors enforcing federal regulation is that of usurpation of prosecutorial discretion.
The Supreme Court has held prosecutorial discretion to be a
federal executive function.' One commentator has suggested that
state prosecutions under federal law would thus violate wellsettled principles regarding the separation of powers." However,
this concern is addressed by Professor Beale's proposal that prosecutorial discretion be exercised on a class, rather than an ad hoc,
basis, that is, by providing the federal prosecutors with discretion
over what types of cases could be brought in what context, regardless of by whom."l Such a system would preserve primary authority in the federal officials, while not leaving state prosecutors feeling powerless to act against hunting violators."'
Public Vote on Subsistence, ANCHORAGE DAiLY NEws, Apr. 23, 1996, at Al
("Past governors and legislatures have made numerous unsuccessful attempts to
[enact subsistence legislation]."). For a scholarly treatment of the equal access
clauses, see White, supra note 7.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); see
also Kurland, supra note 96, at 65.
104. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
105. See id. at 391-92.
106. See Kurland, supra note 96, at 70-74.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Allied Oil Corp., 341 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (holding
that ultimate authority in prosecution of federal cases rests in the President);
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 150 (1927) (holding that all prosecutorial
functions of the Department of Justice are "to be exercised under [the] supervision and direction" of the Attorney General); Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254,
261-62 (1922) (holding that authority to transfer a federal prisoner to state courts,
while not statutorily granted, is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion vested in
the Attorney General); United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 280
(1888) (holding that the Attorney General's powers, as granted in the Judiciary
Act of 1789, are essentially those of his English counterpart, and that he acts as an
agent of the President).
108. See Kurland, supra note 96, at 79-80.
109. See Beale, supra note 96, at 1016-18. Beale notes that this does require a
significant degree of oversight, but argues that it is nonetheless feasible. Her
analysis largely dismisses the constitutional claims raised by Kurland.
110. The effect of such a system would be to ensure enforcement of any regula-
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Thus, although unlikely under present jurisprudence, it might
be possible for a state official to prosecute Totemoff in state court
under ANILCA. It almost certainly would be possible for a federal official to do so. However, the court proceeded impermissibly
by allowing the prosecution under state law. The next section will
address why that is so.
B. Legislative Jurisdiction
Whether a state has the authority to apply its own law to a legal problem - here, whether Alaska could apply its own hunting
regulations to Totemoff's activity - is the basic question of legislative jurisdiction.11 ' The doctrine is constitutional in its 6rigins; indeed, "the underlying source of limitation on legislative jurisdiction [is] federalism.",' 2 Federal legislative jurisdiction is vested in
Congress by article I of the Constitution;"' state legislative jurisdiction, vested by the individual state constitutions, is limited when it
conflicts with the United States Constitution and laws promulgated
thereunder."'
In this case, the question of whether Alaska has legislative jurisdiction over subsistence hunting activity requires a two-step
analysis. The first step is a determination of whether the lands are
properly characterized as state or federal. If the lands in question
are state lands, the state retains control over them unless the state
is limited by a federal doctrine. If the lands are federal, however,
the analysis proceeds to the second step: whether the state retains
any legislative authority over them.

tions that both federal and state prosecutors deem particularly important, even if
federal resources are spread too thin. Such a cooperative enforcement arrangement could go a long way toward easing the tensions that caused this case.
111. See James A. Martin, The Constitution and Legislative Jurisdiction, 10
HoFsTRA L. REv.133, 133 (1981). Black's Law Dictionary defines legislative jurisdiction as "[t]he sphere of authority of a legislative body to enact laws and to
conduct all business incidental to its law-making function." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 900 (6th ed. 1991).

112. Martin, supra note 111, at 145.
113. See U.S. CONST.art. I, § 1.
114. This is the effect of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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1. State lands and legislativejurisdiction. One of the bases of
the Totemoff decision was that the shots were fired and the
spotlight was shone from navigable waters, which the Alaska
Supreme Court treated as state lands."5 The Alaska Supreme
Court reasoned that this was so on the basis of the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953, which granted the states
(1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters
within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural
resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right and
power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said
lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable
[s]tate law." 6
The Submerged Lands Act did reserve to the federal government "all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of
regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the
constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense,
and international affairs, all of which shall be paramount to...
[the state's possessory and administrative interests].""1 7
Prince William Sound is a navigable waterway and therefore
falls within the jurisdiction of the Submerged Lands Act."' Noting
this, the Alaska Supreme Court contended that since neither the
navigational servitude nor the reserved water rights is a possessory
interest, the federal government could claim no title to the waters
of the sound. 9 The court reasoned that although ANILCA spoke
of "'interests' in 'lands' or 'waters,' 'the title to which is in the
United States,' ... the word 'interests' was intended to cover possessory interests lesser than fee interests such as leases, as there is
considerable authority that title can be held to such interests. ""'o
Thus, the court held that navigable waters are state lands that
115. See Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 962 (Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2499 (1996).
116. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994). The provisions of the Submerged Lands Act,
while implicitly applicable to Alaska under the Equal Footing Doctrine, were explicitly made applicable to Alaska in the Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85508, § 6(m), 72 Stat. 339, 343 (1958). See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212,228-29 (1845).
117. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1994). This language is probably redundant because
these interests are constitutionally protected. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
118. See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 957 (noting that the sound is navigable); 43
U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994) ("[T]itle to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable
waters within the boundaries of the respective States... [is] vested in, and assigned to [them].").
119. See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 965 ("[I]t is generally accepted that 'title' signifies at least some sort of possessory interest in property and does not include
lesser interests such as easements." (citations omitted)).
120. Id. at 965-66 (citations omitted).
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ANILCA cannot reach.'
Under this analysis, any conflict with
ANILCA is irrelevant, since exclusive legislative jurisdiction over
the navigable waters is vested in the state.
The Ninth Circuit, however, felt it proper to apply the reserved water rights doctrine. m The doctrine is relatively straightforward in theory: "[W]hen the Federal Government reserves land,
by implication it reserves water rights sufficient to accomplish the
purposes of the reservation."' ' This doctrine is derived from federal powers under the commerce clause, and therefore is not dependent on actual ownership of the waters.' Moreover, the doctrine is absolute and does not call for any equitable balancing
between state and federal interests.1 2 The doctrine protects both
federal use and federal non-use of the water - that is, it can protect
either consumption or conservation or both, depending on the nature of the reservation.12 The court therefore found that subsistence fishing in navigable waters within federal lands was protected by ANILCA.IV
The issue admittedly is more complex in Totemoff, as here the
navigable waters surround the land rather than being contained
within it. New amendments to the Code of Federal Regulations,
proposed by the Department of the Interior in the wake of the
Babbitt decision, explicitly extend the scope of ANILCA to cover
"all public lands including all waters located on these lands, on all
navigable and nonnavigable waters within the exterior boundaries
of... [a series of national parks, preserves, monuments, and refuges], and on inland waters adjacent to the exterior boundaries of
[them]," ' ' but do not extend coverage to coastal waters such as
Prince William Sound. Given the specificity of these regulations,
courts will be reluctant to declare Prince William Sound federally
reserved for the purposes of ANILCA.
However, the resources Totemoff sought were not fish or
121. See id.

122. See Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698, 703 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.

Ct. 1672 (1996).
123. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 (1976).
124. See id. at 138.
125. See id. at 139.
126. See id. at 138-40; see also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699
(1978) (outlining the history of water reservations and noting multiple purposes
for them); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-97 (1963) (analyzing a reservation made under the Indian Commerce Clause).
127. See Babbitt,72 F.3d at 704.
128. Subsistence Management Regulations for Public Lands in Alaska, Identification of Waters Subject to Subsistence Priority Regulation and Expansion of
the Federal Subsistence Program and the Federal Subsistence Board's Authority,
61 Fed. Reg. 15,014, 15,018 (1996) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 242.3).
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wildlife within the waters of Prince William Sound, but rather deer
on Naked Island. This fundamental difference weakens the Alaska
Supreme Court's argument that "the [s]tate has an interest in fish
and wildlife located in navigable waters which precludes federal
regulation of such fish and wildlife.,

129

The federal regulations as

here applied deal with hunting of wildlife clearly located on federal
lands, and any reserved water rights in this context would be for
the purpose of allowing such hunting to go forward.
Moreover, ANILCA specifically requires that regulations
"permit on the public lands appropriate use for subsistence purposes of snowmobiles, motorboats, and other means of surface
transportation traditionally employed for such purposes by local
residents." ' While the statute may be read as requiring only that
motorboats be allowed for transportation purposes, it implies that
they are an integral part of the subsistence hunting process. Since
"appropriate subsistence use" may include hunting from, as well as
riding in, motorboats, ANILCA may be interpreted to reserve waters necessary for motorboat use in hunting, and not merely for
transportation. Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court should at least
have found a federal interest in the lands sufficient to require some
analysis of whether state law might be preempted.
2. Federal lands-now what? The state does have some
authority, albeit limited, to regulate federal lands: "Absent consent
or cession a [s]tate undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal
lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the
power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the
Property Clause.'. The question, in the view of the United States
Supreme Court, "is whether Congress has enacted legislation
respecting this federal land that would pre-empt [state
'
regulations]. ' ,32

Congress has provided a mechanism by which much of state
criminal law is given effect on federal lands. In 1948 it adopted the
Assimilative Crimes Act, 33 which provides that when an act that

129. Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 964 (Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2499 (1996).
130. 16 U.S.C. § 3121(b) (1994).
131. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976) (citing Mason Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 302 U.S. 186, 197 (1937); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243
U.S. 389, 403-05 (1917); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 283 (1899)). This proposition was more recently reaffirmed in California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock
Co., 480 U.S. 572,581 (1987).
132. CaliforniaCoastalComm'n, 480 U.S. at 581.
133. Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 13, 62 Stat. 645, 686 (1948) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
13 (1994)).
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would constitute a state crime is committed on federal lands within
the state, and when that act has not been criminalized or otherwise
made punishable by Congress, the relevant state crime is
"assimilated" and treated as if it were a federal crime under which
the actor may be federally prosecuted." This assimilation of state
criminal law is prospective: laws enacted by the state after the Act
are enforceable on federal lands, as are those which were already
in place at the time of the Act.'35
However, the assimilation under the Act is limited by the existence of other federal law or policy, and state laws may be assimilated only insofar as they do not conflict with it."' The Supreme
Court has cast the limitation very broadly: "Where enforcement of
the state law would handicap efforts to carry out the plans of the
United States, the state enactment must.., give way."' The question of whether the state retains control of the federal lands, therefore, is twofold: (1) whether conflicting federal regulations exist "8
and (2) whether the conflict is such that the state regulation cannot
apply.
The trouble with this analysis is that it presumes that federal
statutes are clear in their intended scope; this is rarely the case.
ANILCA is no exception: "It does not of its own force regulate
subsistence and nonsubsistence uses; it criminalizes no conduct; it
prescribes no penalties. In fact, ANILCA does little more than
provide a broad outline of what uses must be preferred over others; it leaves implementation to the Secretary of the Interior."'39
As a result, after the McDowell v. State decision and the state
legislature's subsequent inaction,1'4 the Department of the Interior
apparently had broad latitude in its implementation. Apparently
in an effort to ease the transition to federal regulation, the department chose to take its regulations restricting the manner of
hunting almost verbatim from the Alaska state law. The Alaska
courts read this symmetry to imply that the state statute could be
applied as readily as the federal statute. 41 To analyze the validity

134. 18 U.S.C. § 13.

135. See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286,293-94 (1958).
136. See James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 103-04 (1940); see also
California CoastalComm'n, 480 U.S. at 581.
137. James Stewart, 309 U.S. at 103 (citing Anderson v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
168 N.W. 196 (1918)).
138. "Conflicting" in this sense means only that the federal regulations govern
the same activities as do the state's.

139. United States v. Alexander, 938 F.2d 942, 945 (1991).
140. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
141. See Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 960 (Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2499 (1996); Totemoff v. State, 866 P.2d 125, 128 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993),
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of this conclusion, however, the two-step analysis discussed above
must be performed.
The first question is easily answered: The federal and state
regulations clearly cover the same activities, and prior to ANILCA
the state hunting regulations applied to acts on federal lands; thus,
the two regulatory schemes are in conflict. As to the second question, state law is preempted in three types of cases: "if it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law; if state regulation
prevents attainment of... [federal] goals; or if a state regulation's
impact on matters within federal control is not an incident of efforts to achieve a proper state purpose."1 42 The state has convincing arguments against preemption to defeat each of these justifications.
The first and third points are the strongest. Compliance with
both state and federal regulations was entirely possible at the time
of Totemoff since the regulations were identical, 43 and hunting certainly is within the state's police power.' 44 As to the second point,
it certainly is true that application of this state statute would not in
itself prevent the attainment of federal goals, since the result of
compliance with identical statutes is identical.
However, the goal of ANILCA is facilitation of subsistence
hunting and that of the state law is regulation of hunting methods.
The Alaska Supreme Court argued that these goals are not inconsistent. Indeed, the court held that by explicit reference to a limited class of permissible hunting methods,' " ANILCA left room for
the regulation of other hunting methods.'"
This logic is somewhat disingenuous. To be sure, the provision does not explicitly preclude regulation (including permission)
of other methods of hunting, but simply provides that motorboats
and snowmobiles specifically shall be allowed. However, the reversionary provision within ANILCA suggests that the state regurev'd, 905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2499 (1996).
142. Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493,
515-16 (1989).
143. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1924)
("The wild animals within its borders are, so far as capable of ownership, owned

by the [s]tate in its sovereign capacity ....Because of such ownership... the
[s]tate may regulate and control the taking, subsequent use and property rights
that may be acquired therein."); State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 552 (Alaska
1976) (holding that attempts to conserve fish within state waters were a valid exercise of state police power).
145. See 16 U.S.C. § 3121(b) (permitting use of "snowmobiles, motorboats and
other means of surface transportation traditionally employed for [subsistence
hunting] purposes").
146. See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 961.
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lations are permitted only so long as the state is fully in compliance
with ANILCA. Once it dropped out of compliance (by failing to
implement regulations pursuant to ANILCA), full regulatory
authority reverted to the Department of the Interior. Given that
the regulatory scheme envisioned by ANILCA is a sweeping, comprehensive one, the attainment of its goals precludes state hunting
regulation on federal lands until the state comes back into compliance with ANILCA.
3. Loose ends. Totemoff and Milette raised two other
arguments that are worth noting but do not fit neatly into the
above categories. The first argument is that the state was estopped
from relitigating the Ninth Circuit's decision that navigable waters
were subject to ANILCA. The second argument is that their
convictions were improper because they were not allowed to raise
a subsistence defense as suggested in United States v. Alexander.147
A third argument, which they did not raise but which has potential
bearing on the case, is that a due process-based doctrine of
"surprise" precludes their prosecution.
a. The estoppel argument. In the wake of Alaska v. Babbitt,4 '
Totemoff contended that the state was collaterally estopped from
relitigating the applicability of ANILCA to navigable waters. The
Alaska Supreme Court rejected this argument: "[The state] is not
collaterally estopped here as to the issues decided in that case
because the applicability of ANILCA to navigable waters is a pure
'
question of law which does not involve factual issues."149
While
this is indeed a question of law, the court's position is not as strong
as its summary rejection of Totemoff's argument would suggest.
The application of collateral estoppel under Alaska law has
three basic criteria:
1. The plea of collateral estoppel must be asserted against a
party or one in privity with a party to the first action;
2. The issue to be precluded from relitigation by operation of the
doctrine must be identical to that decided in the first action;
3. The issue in the first action must have been resolved by a final
judgment on the merits."O

147. 938 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1991).
148. 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
149. Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 963 (citing State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass'n,
895 P.2d 947, 954 (1995)); see also Pacific Marine Ins. Co. v. Harvest States Coop.,
877 P.2d 264, 267 (Alaska 1994) (holding that collateral estoppel is an issue of law
to be reviewed de novo on appeal) (citing Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum
Co., 794 P.2d 949, 951 (Alaska 1990)).
150. Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Serv., 924 P.2d 1006, 1009
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It is irrelevant in the analysis of collateral estoppel whether
the earlier case was state or federal: state courts are required to
give estoppel effect to federal court judgments.151 Moreover, although State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Association," on which
Totemoff relied, provides an exception to the estoppel doctrine for
unmixed questions of law, it does so with a caveat: Relitigation of
an issue of law should be permitted only if "'treating it as conclusively determined would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for
obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule on which it was
based.' '.. In addition, while the Restatement (Second) of Judgments is somewhat permissive of relitigation of issues of law in different fora, it encourages the application of stare decisis,", something which the Alaska Supreme Court clearly did not do. Indeed,
the court entirely ignored its prior reasoning in Sopcak that preclusive considerations are especially strong when the question is one
of federal law.155 In essence, the court held that it is free to reinterpret federal law to its liking and encouraged the state to run to
state courts to correct every unfavorable ruling it gets from the
federal courts. In short, the Alaska Supreme Court's dismissal of
the estoppel argument was likely incorrect, and the lands at issue
in Totemoff should be treated as federal on collateral estoppel
grounds alone.
b. The Alexander defense: Spotlighting as a "traditional
method of subsistence hunting." Given the applicability of
ANILCA, Totemoff also sought to argue that spotlighting must be
permitted as a "traditional means of subsistence hunting," citing as
precedent United States v. Alexander. 56 Under this analysis, the
state regulations need not be stricken, but Totemoff can defend
against the application of the state regulations on the grounds that
their hunting activities are protected as subsistence activities under
(Alaska 1996) (quoting Campion v. State, 876 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Alaska 1994)).
This phrasing of the collateral estoppel criteria is common in Alaska jurisprudence. See, e.g., State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Assoc., 895 P.2d 947, 950-51
(Alaska 1995); Pacific Marine Ins. Co. v. Harvest States Coop., 877 P.2d 264, 267
(Alaska 1994); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Avco Corp., 850 P.2d 628, 634 (Alaska
1993); Murray v. Feight, 741 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Alaska 1987).
151. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1938); Americana Fabrics v. L
& L Textiles, Inc., 754 F.2d 1524, 1529 (9th Cir. 1985); Sopcak, 924 P.2d at 1008.
152. 895 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1995).
153. Id. at 952 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(7)
(1982)).
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 Cmt. i (1982).
155. See Sopcak, 924 P.2d at 1008.
156. 938 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1991); see Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 960
(Alaska 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2499 (1996).
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ANILCA. This defense is flawed in two respects.
First, the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the role of ANILCA was
flawed in Alexander. It argued that "[tihere's no reason to throw a
monkey-wrench into the state regulatory machinery when a little
fine tuning will do."1 This is certainly true, and the Supreme
Court's desire to allow the states to maintain, where possible, their
police powers is manifest.158 However, the mechanism by which
this may properly be done is not an affirmative defense to the state
charges. Preemption is still the rule when federal laws cover specific acts. If there is hunting activity on federal lands in Alaska, it
is governed by ANILCA and the implementing regulations. State
regulations do not apply except as provided in ANILCA,159 and it
makes more sense simply to state this and preclude state exercise
of its legislative jurisdiction than to allow it to attempt regulation
which could then be subject to a new challenge with every new
subsistence case.
Second, even under federal regulations, Totemoff and Milette
would be subject to the federal prohibition against spotlighting. In
that instance, it is no longer a question of independent state regulations clashing with ANILCA. Whereas in Alexander, the court
weighed state regulations against a federal act and regulations that
were silent on the matter, here the "choice" is between state and
federal regulations, both of which prohibit spotlighting. There is
thus direct federal regulation which precludes state regulation in
the same sphere. Totemoff does not present the sort of dormant
commerce clause analysis where one must ask whether the federal
regulatory scheme was so comprehensive as to preclude state
regulation of the same area. That regulation subjects Totemoff
and Milette to liability under ANILCA and precludes the Alexander defense.
c. The due process question. A final possible challenge to the
state's attempt to assert jurisdiction over Totemoff and Milette,
albeit one rarely invoked, is that their prosecution may have
violated their due process rights, under a doctrine of "surprise."
To be sure, "surprise is an irrelevancy in a legal system that

157. Alexander, 938 F.2d at 948.

158. See, e.g, United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2461 (1996)
(holding that state police power cannot be contracted away); United States v.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1633 (1994) (holding that the federal government cannot
exercise a general police power that would conflict with the states'); Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (holding that federal preemption
in an area of traditional state police powers "'should not be lightly inferred"'
(quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987))).
159. See 16 U.S.C. § 3115(d) (1994).
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charges litigants with knowledge of the law."'" However, "[w]hen
the surprise is understandable enough, and when... [application
of] unanticipated law would upset the reasonable planning of the
parties, there is surely an inclination to label the assertion of
legislative jurisdiction as unfair and hence a violation of due
process." '
This doctrine of surprise, arising primarily from the case of
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick," could prove useful in this context.
ANILCA's apparent announcement of a comprehensive scheme
protecting subsistence hunting on federal lands may have induced
Totemoff and Milette to believe they were immune from prosecution under state law. While they can argue this, they cannot claim
that they believed that they were immune from prosecution altogether because the federal regulations clearly criminalize the conduct in which they sought to engage. Absent such federal regulations, "surprise," as well as ANILCA's intent to occupy the field,
would preclude application of state regulations.
Thus, while this surprise doctrine would not have helped Totemoff and Milette, it could be important to others in the future assuming two conditions: first, that ANILCA continues to provide
for a relatively comprehensive scheme of regulation; and second,
that ANILCA does not regulate a particular subsistence activity,
which is then prosecuted under state regulations.
V. CONCLUSION

Totemoff and Milette did violate the law. They hunted in a
manner proscribed by regulations of which they should have been
aware, and indeed they were convicted of such a violation. However, they were convicted of violating the wrong regulations. The
Alaska Supreme Court, in an effort to assert the fullest possible
reach of state legislative and regulatory authority, incorrectly narrowed the reach of federal jurisdiction. To be sure, the matter
could have been heard in state court, as the states have the
160. Martin, supra note 111, at 134.

161. Id.
162. 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (treating the application of Texas law to a Mexican
company's insurance policy as unfair surprise, despite the assignee's residence in
Texas). Justice Stevens is the greatest advocate on the bench of this doctrine.
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 837 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A] constitutional claim of 'unfair surprise'

. . .

rest[s] on a persuasive showing of an unexpected result arrived at by

application of that law." (emphasis omitted)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302, 327 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Th[e] desire to prevent unfair surprise
to a litigant has been the central concern in this Court's review of choice-of-law
decisions under the Due Process Clause.").
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authority to hear federal "penal" matters. However, the federal
regulations - on which Totemoff and Milette could properly have
been charged - were ignored. As it does not appear that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari on this question in the foreseeable future, the burden rests on the Alaska Supreme Court to limit
as much as possible the scope of its holding.
David G. Shapiro

